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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament 
theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours 
required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial 
incentives worked past the minimum time, but awarding a tournament prize increased work time 
and effort by over 80% and lowered costs of effort or output by over a third. Effort was similar 
with alternative (piece rate, low-prize tournament) bonuses. Men worked longer than women in 
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Devoting long hours to work is costly to individuals, who must forgo more and more leisure time 
and home production. The costs are especially onerous for workers with time commitments 
outside of the labor market, such as workers with family caretaking responsibilities.1 Yet long 
hours are common across a range of occupations and are typically required of workers in elite 
professional careers who compete against one another for pay and promotions (Goldin, 2014; 
Gicheva, 2013; Lazear, 2018). This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that competition 
contributes to long work hours, drawing on the prediction from tournament theory that rewarding 
workers based on their relative performance can induce them to supply high effort (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981). Because effort can be increased along the intensive margin, by working harder per 
unit time, or along the extensive margin, by working longer, an implicit feature of the theory is 
that competition itself can result in long working hours.  
This prediction is intuitive, as it corresponds to popular notions of a “rat race” at work, 
but it has not previously been tested. We do this by measuring the effects of workplace 
competition on labor supply and firm costs using a field experiment in which workers are 
assigned to competitive and non-competitive payment schemes. Our research design enables us 
to rule out variation due to productive technology because workers are all hired to perform the 
same job under identical conditions. The only difference is compensation, where workers in the 
competitive scheme compete for a bonus prize. We also shut the channel of worker self-selection 
into competition by assigning workers to schemes and by not informing them in advance of the 
possibility of a bonus prize.  
In our implementation, workers were all undergraduate students, offered a fixed ($25) 
payment for an hour-long research assistance (RA) work session in which they and other 
students tested and benchmarked a tablet-computer program for a professor. After they arrived, 
they were assigned to gender-balanced rooms of 4 workers and provided a brief training session. 
In it, they were told they only needed to work for 10 minutes and then complete a survey about 
the program to be paid the $25 wage. The nature and purpose of the work, including the value to 
the employer of the work and of additional effort from workers, were also explained to them. 
                                                          
1 Women still devote significantly more time to childcare than men do, but paternal time has been 
increasing in recent decades; men increasingly describe parenthood as essential to their identities and 




Workers were asked to try as hard as they could and to stay for as long as they could, for a 
maximum of 40 minutes. In rooms with tournament pay, the bonus scheme was described to 
workers at the end of training.   
Relative to the experimental literature on tournaments, the primary innovation of our 
design is that we explicitly allow workers to select both the total duration of their job and the 
level of effort they exert per unit of time. Previous studies have used a “stated effort” framework 
(Bull et al., 1987) or focused on the effort intensity margin, either measuring total output for a 
fixed amount of time (Gneezy et al., 2003; Freeman and Gelber, 2010, Dohmen and Falk, 2011) 
or speed to complete a fixed task, such as a race (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004). Non-
experimental studies of competition, such as Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) and Bandiera et al. 
(2005), have also focused on the intensive margin of effort rather than on work time.2 
Moreover, our design uses a field experiment with workers performing a real job that is 
valuable to the employer (DellaVigna et al., 2016) to incorporate the insights from the recent 
behavioral economics literature suggesting that individuals might be motivated to stay longer and 
work harder than their minimum or contracted hours when asked to do so by their employer 
because of behavioral motivations (for surveys, see Gneezy et al., 2011 and Cooper and Kagel, 
2016). Failing to include these motivations in the counterfactual without a bonus could overstate 
the real-world value of tournament pay, particularly if financial incentives crowd out non-
financial impulses (Deci, 1971; Gneezy et al., 2011). Therefore, our field experiment includes 
several design components meant to trigger those impulses (discussed in Section 2.2). These 
efforts appear successful in the data: over 58% of workers in the fixed (no bonus) payment 
scheme worked longer than 11 minutes (Figure 1). Nevertheless, effort is costly to our workers: 
only 7% worked the full 40 minutes and 30% left within 7 seconds of the minimum time. 
Our main finding is that work time is substantially higher among workers competing for a 
tournament prize bonus of $30 to the worker with the highest output in their pre-defined 4-
person work group. In that treatment, 55% worked the full 40 minutes and only 15% worked less 
than 11 minutes. Workers in the $30 bonus group also invested more effort per minute of work 
than those who were not offered the chance to compete for a bonus. However, this intensive 
margin response had a small impact on overall performance relative to the extensive margin 
                                                          
2 Outside of the literature on competition, a few recent laboratory experiments have used work time as an 
outcome (Bracha et al., 2015; Linardi and McConnell, 2011; Abeler et al., 2011). 
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response. Paying a bonus increased total employer costs per work group. To recover these costs, 
we needed total work time to increase by at least 30%. The average induced increase in effort 
and performance was greater than 80%. Therefore, our costs per unit of input (work time, effort) 
or output (task performance) were significantly lower (over 30%) when we paid a bonus.   
We focus on tournaments in this paper because of their importance in the workplace, 
particularly for attaining high-status jobs through promotions, which Lazear (2018) notes 
“almost always require relative rankings” (p. 202). Within organizations, relative comparisons 
are often used in employees’ formal performance reviews that determine their promotions, salary 
increases, and layoffs. A prominent example is the practice known of “stacked ranking” or 
“forced ranking” in which evaluators must conform to a predetermined structure for the overall 
score distribution, such as shares of employees in highest or lowest categories.3 Workers may 
feel further pressure from outside their organizations to invest in work effort; this pressure may 
come from external competition in labor markets or product markets.  
Incentive pay based on individual performance, such as a piece rate, is more common in 
jobs where individual output is easily measured and closely related to effort, such as 
manufacturing. Even though we are primarily interested in elite competitive jobs, because we 
can measure individual effort and output in our setting, we also consider an auxiliary treatment in 
which all workers are paid a bonus based on their individual performance, with a piece rate value 
set to match the average employer cost per unit of output in the tournament scheme. We find that 
paying that piece rate significantly increased time worked and overall effort and reduced costs of 
effort or output relative to the treatment with no performance-based incentives. In fact, these 
outcomes were not different from the ones in the $30 tournament. We also explored the effects of 
awarding a small ($15) prize to the tournament winner; we found significantly higher effort 
compared to no bonus, but no significant difference in overall effort or costs relative to the 
higher-stakes tournament or piece rate.  
                                                          
3 The increased popularity of personnel practices involving relative comparisons with fixed proportions of 
employees promoted or retained has been attributed to Jack Welch’s “rank and yank” approach at General 
Electric in the 1980s. In recent years, opposition to these schemes has become more prominent, because 
of their effects on employee morale (see, e.g., Backstone, 2019, on Facebook’s system) and possible 
contribution to sex discrimination (see, e.g., Greenfield and Green, 2017, for reporting on lawsuits against 
Microsoft, Goldman Sachs and Uber; also see a legal blog on the topic at 
https://www.law360.com/articles/778682/when-employee-ranking-systems-become-a-legal-liability). 
Some companies have moved away from strict forced ranking, but it is unclear that the replacement 
practices are free from any relative comparisons or that they will persist.  
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Thus, our results clearly show a strong causal relationship between performance-based 
incentive pay and work hours. This implies that the competitive nature of many high-status and 
high-pay careers, in which workers compete against their colleagues for bonuses and promotions, 
is likely to be part of the explanation for their long work hours. Workers in these jobs are not 
typically paid on an hourly basis or for fixed time shifts. Rather, they have flexibility about how 
long to work, and can voluntarily provide working hours well beyond the standard workweek in 
order improve their performance rank. Since workplaces typically hire workers of similar ability 
levels, even the highest ability workers will need to invest long hours to distinguish themselves 
from (or not fall behind) their equally capable colleagues.  
Furthermore, our results indicate that competitive compensation schemes can be cost-
effective and therefore profitable for firms. If they generalize, the induced increase in output that 
results from the longer working hours (even if only a subset of workers is actively vying for a 
promotion or bonus) is enough to justify the costs of providing performance-based incentive pay. 
The profitability of competitive pay is the direct result of the labor supply effects we estimate 
and can explain its widespread prevalence.  
These findings therefore contribute to the literature exploring the reasons for long work 
hours in elite careers. Prior studies have emphasized explanations such as production technology 
(Goldin, 2014) or worker signaling of their ability or commitment (Landers et al., 1996, 1997). 
To focus on the role of tournament incentives in generating long work hours, a phenomenon that 
has not previously been examined, our study therefore eliminates these alterative explanations by 
design. 
The theory we consider differs from the model in Goldin (2014), which posits a convex 
production technology, in that competition can be profitable even with a linear technology or 
diminishing returns to effort. While there are reasons to expect an increasing marginal product of 
labor at low work hours (from fixed hiring costs or transition costs into tasks for workers), long 
hours must be accompanied by long working days. Therefore, it is also natural to expect 
diminishing returns to take effect at some point because of fatigue.4 The models also differ 
starkly in their predictions about the future of work hours. Goldin (2014) expresses optimism 
about the potential for innovations in production technology to reduce the convexity (for 
                                                          




example by increasing the substitutability between individual workers) and thereby increase 
workplace flexibility and reduce work hours. However, if one source of long work hours is 
worker competition, there is no such expectation.  
Our model resembles that in Goldin (2014) in that the additional work hours must be 
productive in terms of increasing output for the firm. That distinguishes it from the signaling 
theory in Landers et al. (1996, 1997), in which the value to the firm from the long hours is the 
information that it provides about workers’ types rather than the additional output. Despite this 
key difference, our model resembles that in Landers et al. (1996, 1997) in that the primary 
motivator for workers to supply long hours is the desire to succeed in promotion competitions 
(such as making partner at a law firm, getting tenure in academia or serving in top management 
at a company). In fact, the central hypothesis of this paper – that incentives from workplace 
competition increase work hours – can be found in Waldman (1997)’s comment on Landers et al. 
(1997): competition is proposed as an alternative to signaling as the source of the positive 
association between work hours and pay.  
The idea that competitive incentives increase work hours is also related to Bell and 
Freeman’s (2001) hypothesis that Americans work longer hours than Germans do because 
greater US wage inequality makes them more concerned about gaining promotions and 
advancing in the earnings distribution. In that framework, wage inequality increases the value of 
winning the workplace tournament and therefore the intensity of competition.  
 Our overall findings for all workers have implications for understanding the gender pay 
gap. Because women tend to face tighter time constraints from caregiving and home obligations, 
they may be less willing (or able) to match their male coworkers’ work hours and advance 
professionally. Several recent studies have identified long working hours as an impediment to 
women’s career progress (Bertrand, Goldin, Katz, 2010; Flabbi and Moro, 2012; Gicheva, 2013; 
Cortes and Pan, 2016, 2017; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wasserman, 2018). By increasing the 
number of hours required to advance in elite professional occupations, competition may 
therefore be contributing indirectly to gender pay gaps by lowering women’s representation in 
those professions (Blau and Kahn, 2000; Gicheva, 2013) and especially in their highest ranks 
(Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Matsa and Miller, 2011; Kunze and Miller, 2017). The role of 
workplace competition has previously been examined as a contributor to gender pay gaps (see 
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Niederle 2016 for a for a comprehensive summary), but not through the channel of extended 
work hours. 
Finally, motivated by the literature finding gender differences in initial entry decisions 
into tournaments, as well as in performance in certain types of tournaments (see Niederle, 2016), 
we also examine possible gender differences in the labor supply response to tournament pay. Our 
design ensures that all workers are available for more than the maximum time, yet men worked 
significantly longer and harder than women did in our main $30 tournament. There were no 
significant gender differences in effort under fixed or piece rate pay or in the $15 tournament. To 
the extent that the gender difference in effort and persistence we find in the $30 tournament also 
applies to high-stakes workplace competitions more generally, it suggests a further channel 
through which workplace competition deters women’s progress in elite occupations and their 
ascension to the top ranks of the earnings distribution.   
 
2. Theory and Design of the Field Experiment 
The major advantage of conducting a controlled field experiment to study the effects of 
competition is avoiding the fundamental difficulty with observational data that competitive pay 
is not randomly distributed across jobs or workers. We do this by having workers perform the 
same job in the same environment under alternative treatments that vary only in the opportunity 
and rules for earning a bonus payment. We also control the assignment of workers to payment 
scheme treatments and offer workers no choice of scheme. In fact, workers assigned to a bonus 
scheme are informed about it only after they sit down to start their work session. That means that 
bonus group assignment could not possibly affect a person’s decision of whether to accept the 
job or to show up for work. Our controlled setting also enables us to eliminate alternative sources 
of long work time proposed in the prior literature by using a non-convex (linear) production 
technology and a single-shot RA position (with no signaling value).  
These aspects of our research design help us isolate and measure the effects of 
competition on extensive (time) and intensive (effort per unit time) margins of effort supplied by 
workers. The remainder of this section describes and motivates our other design choices about 





2.1 Main Treatments: Tournament versus Fixed Payment  
In devising our tournament treatment, we start with the requirements that (1) the payment 
scheme includes financial rewards based on relative performance, (2) performance is a function 
of effort, along both extensive and intensive margins, and (3) workers are given freedom in 
setting their effort levels and work time. The details of the treatment, called TP30, are as follows: 
TP30: All workers who provide at least 10 minutes of work and then complete a 
questionnaire about the work are paid $25 for their time. In addition, workers in this treatment 
compete for a Tournament Prize bonus of $30 paid to one winner from each gender-balanced 
group of four workers (2 men and 2 women). We set a value of $30 for the prize because it is the 
smallest round (multiple of 10) dollar amount larger than the promised pay of $25. Competitors 
in each tournament perform the task simultaneously (receiving their training together and starting 
at the same time) but independently (on separate tablets) in a small room. The winner of the 
tournament is the person with the highest total output (defined in Section 2.2). In the event of a 
tie, the winner is chosen randomly from among those with the highest output. No one except the 
winner is paid a bonus. Workers are told about the bonus prize after being told they will receive 
the promised $25 if they work for at least 10 minutes (rather than the hour for which they were 
hired) as part of the short initial training at the start of the work session. During this training, the 
task, its purpose, and the value of the work to the employer are discussed (see details below). 
Workers can work for a maximum of 40 minutes, at which point the program automatically shifts 
to the questionnaire. 
A key feature of the design is that all workers are explicitly told that they are “free to 
leave” after they finish working and complete the questionnaire. Even though the winner of the 
tournament bonus can only be determined after the last worker has finished, there is no reason 
for other workers to stay until the end of the session, because all workers are paid via PayPal 
within two days of the work session. The option to leave the job site after they stop working, 
rather than needing to remain for the rest of the hour, substantially increases the opportunity cost 
to workers of expending effort on the extensive margin.  
We estimate the impact of competition on labor supply by comparing outcomes in TP30 
to those in a treatment under which workers are given the same options about how long to stay, 
but not provided with any explicit monetary incentive to work past 10 minutes. This is our fixed 
payment (FP) scheme. 
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 FP: In the Fixed Payment treatment, workers perform the same task under the same 
conditions as those in TP30, except that they are paid the same $25 regardless of how long they 
work beyond the mandatory 10 minutes. Like TP30 workers, FP workers are kindly asked to stay 
for as long as they can (up to 40 minutes) and to work as hard as they can, because it will benefit 
the employer, but no additional payment is offered beyond the promised $25.  
 
2.1.1 Theory Considerations for Tournament Treatment  
In the classic Lazear and Rosen (1981) setup, the theoretical prediction is clear that we should 
expect greater effort in TP30 than in FP. The particulars of our setup differ slightly from the 
main example in Lazear and Rosen (1981) in that our random “luck” term affects output 
multiplicatively rather than additively and that we have 4 workers in the room, but these 
differences will not change the qualitative results. 
At a Nash Equilibrium outcome, workers in TP30 take their competitors’ strategies as 
given and adjust their effort levels to the point of equalizing the marginal costs and benefits of 
effort, or until they hit a binding constraint. The marginal cost of effort is the incremental 
disutility from engaging in the task and forgoing alternative activities during that time. The 
marginal benefit of effort is the change in the probability of winning (as a result of increased 
effort) times the increase in utility from winning.  
Our experiment allows effort to vary along both extensive (time worked) and intensive 
(effort per minute) margins, but the distinction is immaterial to the predictions from the Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) model. Nevertheless, it is useful to note that the time dimension of the 
problem, a key focus of this paper, resembles a war of attrition. Because workers are in the same 
room, they can employ strategies that vary with their coworkers’ departure times. If we eliminate 
the random shocks to productivity and variation in the intensive margin of effort (per minute 
worked), our setting matches the classic war of attrition considered in Hendricks et al. (1988) for 
2 players. The winner is then simply the person who stays longer, and he or she is assumed to 
quit immediately after the loser does. This makes the payoffs equivalent to a second-price all-pay 
auction. Without random shocks to productivity, there are sharp discontinuities in returns to 
effort, as chances of winning go from 0 to 0.5 for the move from a narrow loss to a tie and from 
0.5 to 1 from a tie to a narrow win. This drives the pure strategy Nash equilibrium to extreme 
cases in which both workers either leave within a few seconds or stay until the terminal time. 
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Mixed strategies that involve workers staying for intermediate amounts of time can smooth away 
jumps in the returns to effort function and may also be possible in equilibrium. In our setting, the 
existence of a luck component accomplishes the smoothing and allows for interior solutions. 
Moreover, workers who are the last to remain in their session may still continue to work as long 
as working increases their chances of winning and the marginal benefit is greater than the 
marginal cost.  
Our research design limits work time to a maximum of 40 minutes, which is also similar 
to the finite time horizon in Hendricks et al. (1988). This constraint lowers the level of effort 
supplied by workers whose optimal unconstrained work time is greater than 40 minutes. 
However, it can also induce offsetting spillover effects. This happens if some workers whose 
optimal work time is under 40 minutes in the unconstrained equilibrium experience greater 
returns to effort with the constraint because now their competitors are prevented from working 
beyond 40 minutes. Those workers will increase their effort levels as a result, making the impact 
of the constraint on total work effort supplied in the room theoretically ambiguous.  
Spillover effects can also induce workers to change their optimal effort levels in response 
to the distribution of other workers in the room with them. A worker who expects one or more 
competitors to quit early (e.g., because of high effort costs) will have a higher marginal benefit 
of staying longer (and higher total benefit of staying the full time) than an otherwise identical 
worker who expects to face 3 competitors until the end.  
Thus, although the direction is clear, the extent of the labor supply response to 
tournament pay depends on the distribution of worker types and the equilibrium outcome of the 
game that is played (which may not be unique) and is therefore clearly an empirical question. 
Furthermore, as we discuss in the next subsection, if we relax the theoretical setup to incorporate 
agents who are not purely rational selfish optimizing workers, then even the direction of the 
effect can be ambiguous.  
 
2.1.2 Design Considerations for the Fixed Payment Treatment 
In the standard model, workers expend no costly effort beyond the minimum required in their 
contracts for payment, which makes the FP treatment trivial and potentially unnecessary for 
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assessing TP30.5 We have two main reasons for including the FP comparison. The first is simply 
to confirm that effort is costly to workers, which we do by checking that not all FP workers 
stayed for 40 minutes and exerted maximal effort. The fact that 30% of FP workers left within 7 
seconds of the minimum time further points to costly effort.  
Our second motivation for including this treatment is grounded in recent results from the 
behavioral economics literature suggesting that workers do, at times, work longer than their 
contractually mandated hours even without explicit monetary compensation. This happens, for 
example, when they are intrinsically motivated because of characteristics of the work itself (see 
Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel, 2011 for a recent survey)6 or when they are the type of person who 
always works hard (“boy scouts” in Segal, 2012) or when work relationships include elements of 
gift-exchange (see Cooper and Kagel, 2016 for a recent survey). Because these factors are likely 
to operate in the workplace, and because their effects on labor supply may be partially or entirely 
crowded out by offering monetary incentives, we decided it was important to include an FP 
comparison group for our measurement of the effects of competition.  
For the FP comparison to be meaningful, however, we need to use a field experiment 
with a real work task that has value to the employer (DellaVigna et al., 2016) rather than a real-
effort task in a laboratory experiment.7 Four elements of the field experiment design contribute, 
in combination, to inducing FP workers to work longer than the minimum time in response to the 
request to do so.  
First, we ensure that workers are available to stay for longer than 10 minutes, and rule out 
external time constraints as a source of variation in labor supply, by hiring workers for a full 
hour and then setting a maximum work time of only 40 minutes.  
Second, we use a task in which greater effort (on both the intensive and extensive 
margins) can credibly be described as beneficial to the employer. Our explanation (described in 
                                                          
5 If a worker faces a threat (explicit or implicit) of being fired for working less than some number of hours 
above their contracted work hours, we would clearly consider the necessary hours, rather than the 
nominally contracted hours, to be the relevant minimum number of hours for that job. 
6 We are focused on costly effort and therefore not interested in capturing intrinsic motivation from a 
work task that is itself enjoyable to workers. Even if workers find parts of their jobs intrinsically 
motivating and therefore experience periods of low (or even negative) effort costs, this is unlikely to 
apply to all necessary parts of the job to a degree that exceeds enjoyment from leisure (Lazear, 2018).  
7 While laboratory experiments can allow for a deeper understanding of the operating forces, our concern 
here is that subjects in a laboratory would treat the tasks they are asked to perform as games rather than 
work, and we would not be able to induce workplace social considerations.    
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detail in Section 2.2) is that the employer needs reliable performance data on the computer 
program that will be used in future research.8 Workers are told that the purpose of the job is to 
learn how well people can perform the task under different conditions and asked to, “please try 
your best” (emphasis in the written script; see Appendix B). This makes it clear to workers that 
investing high effort is expected and necessary for the employer to achieve the goals for which 
the worker is hired.  
The “testing and benchmarking” task also provides a natural justification for the unusual 
combination of conditions: hiring workers for a full hour, only requiring that they stay for 10 
minutes, but then asking them to stay as long as they can. We explain to workers that, although 
the employer asked them to be available for the full hour, she thought that it “might be too taxing 
to do this task for so long.” In fact, workers are told that figuring out how long individuals can 
perform the task is one of the reasons why they were hired. Therefore, the instructions state that 
while the employer “would like you to stay for as long as you can, in order to get paid you only 
need to perform the task for at least 10 minutes and answer the questionnaire about the task.” Not 
only are workers asked multiple times to try hard and to work as long as possible, but the 
purpose is also explained to them – it is in order to improve the quality of data received from the 
testing. Thus, workers are told that staying longer is beneficial to the employer, but it is not 
necessary for receiving the $25 wage.  
Third, we surprise workers favorably about their working conditions (and for some, their 
compensation). This is intended to trigger positive feelings towards the employer. Telling 
workers that they only need to work 10 minutes in order to be paid the full amount promised for 
one hour provides an unexpected “gift” to workers from the employer and may inspire 
reciprocity motives. These motives should be enhanced by the reason given for the shortened 
work time, which is the employer’s concern for the workers’ wellbeing.  
Fourth, the employer shows respect and appreciation for the workers’ effort. She does 
this by kindly asking workers to “please stay as long as you can” and “please try your best” 
(emphasis in both cases in the written script; see Appendix B). She also does it by explaining to 
them how their output will be used in future research. These efforts should enhance reciprocity, 
feelings of duty, and intrinsic motivation, and direct those impulses to be expressed through 
increased labor supply.   
                                                          
8 A variant of the program was indeed used by one of the authors in subsequent research.    
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In practice, as discussed in Section 4 below, our efforts were successful at inducing many 
workers in FP to stay beyond the required 10 minutes, some for significantly longer: over 58% 
worked longer than 11 minutes and 7% worked the full 40 minutes (Figure 1). We believe that 
behavioral considerations are the most likely reason for this additional labor supply in FP rather 
than dynamic considerations about future employment or recommendation letters from the 
supervising professor. We attempted to exclude those out in our design by hiring workers for a 
one-time job, as part of a time-sensitive mass-recruiting drive, rather than an ongoing 
relationship, and by using a rote and unskilled task.9  
 
2.2 The Work Task: Benchmarking the Red Square Program 
As described above, workers are hired for research assistance positions aimed at helping to test 
and benchmark a computer program. The program is generically named Red Square.10 It is a 
simple “game” in which players earn points by tapping on stationary squares that appear on a 
tablet computer (see screenshots in Appendix B). We use a computer program so that we can 
control the task and automatically track how workers engage with the program to create reliable 
measures of effort and output. The job of testing a new program also makes it natural to collect 
end-line survey data about the subjective work experience and opinions of the program.  
During a work session, the program alternates between “active” and “rest” screens. At the 
start of each active screen, a stationary red square appears at a random location. The player earns 
a point if they tap on the square. Once the red square is tapped, it disappears from the screen, and 
a button appears that allows the player to advance to the next rest screen. If the player does not 
tap the advance button, the screen automatically advances to the rest screen 10 seconds after the 
start of the current active screen, whether or not the red square has been tapped. Each rest screen 
lasts 10 seconds; there is nothing for players to do during this time. Once 10 seconds have 
elapsed, the rest screen disappears and the next active screen appears. This cycle repeats until the 
end of testing. The only variation is that, with a probability of 10%, the active screen includes a 
gold square (in a random location) in addition to the red one. Tapping the gold square earns 5 
                                                          
9 We are not able to say for certain what workers expected, but it is worth noting that not a single worker 
contacted the employer requesting a reference letter or additional employment. 
10 Workers are not specifically told the name of the program, but the name is stored on the work tablets, 
and so can potentially be discovered by them. 
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points, so workers can earn 6 points on a screen with a gold square by tapping both gold and red 
squares.  
For the duration of the work session, the following items are displayed on the top left of 
the screen: running tallies of accumulated points earned and time worked and a countdown timer 
showing the time left on the current screen. After 10 minutes of testing, a “Go to the 
questionnaire” button appears on the bottom of the screen. The worker then has the option to tap 
on the button and end their testing session immediately or to continue working and tap on the 
button at a later time.11 After 40 minutes of testing, the questionnaire automatically appears on 
the screen. Workers can therefore spend between 10 and 40 minutes on the work task. There is 
no time limit for the questionnaire.  
Several features of the task are worth highlighting.  
First, the task is extremely simple to understand and to perform. There is no scope for 
outside knowledge to affect performance and workers need only brief training.  
Second, the inclusion of rest screens helps prevent even highly motivated workers from 
straining or over-exerting themselves. This should make it physically possible for all workers to 
perform the task for extended periods of time.  
Third, the enforced waiting from the rest screen also serves the function of making the 
task quite boring and tedious, which increases the costs of effort. It is crucial for us that workers 
not find the task intrinsically enjoyable or fun, because we want to study costly labor supply. The 
choice of stationary squares, always the same size and colors, are similarly intended to reduce 
enjoyment of the task. The random elements, varying the location of the red square and only 
offering gold squares on occasion, might make the game slightly more interesting, but they also 
increase the attention demanded of players, who have to scan each new active screen to find the 
square or squares. Responses to the questionnaire item of “How much did you enjoy the game?” 
confirm that workers did not generally enjoy the task. With a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very 
much), 61.4% answered 0 (29.2%) or 1 (32.2%).12  
                                                          
11 To avoid mistaken termination from accidental taps, workers are asked to confirm their decision to end 
the work session before they advance to the survey. The exact wording is “Are you sure you want to stop 
working on the task? You will not be able to return to the task.” The options are: “Cancel” or “Continue 
to questionnaire.” 
12 Workers in FP, who had no financial incentive to stay longer than the minimum time, but who often 
did, actually expressed the least enjoyment: 73.3% answered 0 (33.3%) or 1 (40.0%). 
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Fourth, workers can vary the amount of effort they exert within the program along both 
extensive and intensive margins, and their output (number of points earned) increases in direct 
proportion to their effort. By tapping the “Go to next screen” button on the active screen faster, a 
worker earns points faster. They still have to spend 10 seconds on the rest screen, but the next 
active screen arrives sooner and increases the number of points that can be earned per unit of 
time worked. At one extreme, a worker who never taps “Go to next screen” will be shown 3 
active screens per minute, or 120 over 40 minutes. A worker who instead clicks “Go to next 
screen” after 1 second, on average, will see about 5.5 active screens per minute, or 218 over 40 
minutes.  
We are therefore able to use the program to construct three measures of effort. The first is 
simply the extensive margin of time spent working. The second captures total effort on both 
margins: it is the total number of times a worker taps the “go to next screen” button over the 
entire 40-minute work session. For the intensive margin, we also use the frequency of taps, but 
only include minutes in which the worker is working. We chose the “go to next screen” button 
instead of the red square (though results are unchanged if we use the latter instead, or if we use 
total points) because the variation in red square taps is driven almost entirely by variation in 
active screen time and the resulting frequency of red square offers.  
Fifth, the “gold square” feature of the program described above introduces a random 
“luck” component to the output function that maps effort to points earned. This generates 
randomness in outcomes, similar to the ε term in Lazear and Rosen (1981), as discussed above in 
Section 2.1.  
Finally, the potential for differences in physical (finger speed) or cognitive (alertness) 
ability to affect performance is very limited relative to the scope for differences in effort. This 
means it is practically impossible for a high ability worker to “work smarter, not harder” or to 
“coast” on low effort and still earn a high score; the only way to earn points is to sit in the room, 
watch the screen, and tap the squares. It also means that low ability workers should feel that they 
have a chance to win and therefore expend effort.13 Although ability variation may be quite 
important in productive output, most high-stakes workplace competitions include an abundance 
of high-ability contenders. This makes low-effort a risky (and generally unsuccessful) strategy, 
                                                          
13 Lazear and Rosen (1981) demonstrate that mixed-ability tournaments with private information about 
ability will generally lead to inefficient levels of effort. Brown (2011) shows empirically that large skill 
differences among competitors lower average effort. 
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even for the most talented among them. Thus, it was important to minimize the role of ability in 
our work environment.   
  
2.3 Alternative Bonus Schemes  
In addition to our main comparison between TP30 and FP, we also study two alternative bonus 
schemes. As in the first two treatments, workers in these treatments are all paid the promised $25 
for staying at least 10 minutes. They may also receive an additional bonus payment that is related 
to their performance of the task. 
PR: Because we can measure effort and performance exactly in our setting, piece rate 
compensation is possible. We use the PR treatment to test if outcomes differ with individual 
incentives, based on absolute instead of relative performance. We set the price per point to match 
the actual average amount paid in bonus per point under the TP30 tournament, which was 3⅓ 
cents per point.14 As discussed in Lazear and Rosen (1981), it is theoretically unclear a priori 
how labor supply, worker utility or firm profits will compare between tournament pay and piece-
rate compensation.  
TP15: Our choice of $30 for the main tournament was based on setting a bonus level 
above the fixed payment amount. We have no reason to expect that it will be optimal for 
employers. In particular, by limiting the total work time to 40 minutes, we also limit the amount 
of incremental effort the employer can extract from each worker. This suggests that a lower prize 
amount might be equally effective, which we test with TP15, in which a $15 prize is paid to the 
winner of each tournament. Our expectation is that a lower prize value will weakly decrease the 
total effort supplied at the room level. We have no such prediction at the individual level, 
because the $15 difference in prize value could have different utility effects on different workers. 
If some workers who stayed to the end in TP30 decide to quit early, others who left early in 
TP30 might respond by increasing their effort to become contenders in TP15.   
 
3. Implementation of the Field Experiment  
The field study was conducted at a major American research university in the Spring of 2016. A 
professor at the university sent emails to departmental undergraduate major email lists with the 
                                                          
14 As we do not know our workers’ degree of risk aversion or their beliefs about competitors’ strategies, 
we are unable to derive the piece rate value that is, on average, equivalent to TP30 from their perspective. 
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job announcement that invited interested applicants to click on a link to an online survey to 
apply. The email made it clear that multiple RAs were needed and would be hired for the same 
position. All recruitment material and scripts are in Appendix B. Applicants had several days to 
complete the online survey, and the work sessions were held in conveniently located library 
study rooms on campus. Potential workers were provided a link to a secure website where they 
can apply for the position and provide contact (name, email address, phone number) and 
background (gender, major, year, GPA) information and list their periods of availability during 
the workweek. We used availability and gender for work assignment and asked about year, major 
and GPA for plausibility.   
Conditional on availability and gender, applicants were randomly assigned to one-hour 
work sessions (particular time slots on particular days) in such a way that each session had an 
equal number of men and women assigned to that session. Applicants were informed by email 
that they were hired, provided with the date and time of the work session and the location of a 
central room used for intake, and asked to confirm their employment by clicking a link and 
completing an online form.  
In this email, they were explicitly told that they would be working in groups and asked to 
therefore arrive a few minutes early to ensure a timely start. Workers could have assumed before 
this point that they would be working in groups – because of the initial statement about a large 
number of workers to be hired ASAP and because of the sign-up form offering fixed time slots 
for availability – but even if they had not done so previously, it would be clear to all workers 
before they arrived at the work session that other student RAs would be present as well. 
To increase attendance at the work sessions, workers who confirmed employment were 
sent a reminder the day before the assigned session.15 Slots that opened up because invited 
workers declined the invitation were reassigned to other applicants to the extent possible. No 
applicant was ever assigned to more than one work session.16  
Workers arrived at the work location and checked in with the manager at the central 
intake room. Workers were allocated into rooms to maximize the number of 4-person, gender 
balanced rooms. Workers in all rooms tested the same computer game, but different room-
                                                          
15 The average share (across sessions) of confirmed workers who showed-up as scheduled was 91% while 
the median show-up rate was 92%. 
16 One person managed to sign up twice by using a different email address for signup but the same PayPal 
account. This was discovered after the fact, and we dropped the room from the analysis.  
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session combinations were assigned to different compensation scheme treatments.17 We 
confirmed the balance of workers’ characteristics (as reported in the sign-up form) across 
treatment, for all workers, and separately by gender. Results, in Appendix Table A1, show no 
significant differences across treatments (from joint F-tests) in most outcomes, but we do fail the 
balance test at the 10 percent level (in 3 out of 42 tests) for being a third year student in the 
pooled and male samples and for being a first year in the female sample. Controlling for these 
variables in our individual level regressions (pooled or by gender) has no effect on the estimated 
treatment effects.  
At the designated session start time, trained graduate student assistants escorted the 
workers in groups to their assigned rooms to start the work. Workers sat in front of tablets, and 
the assistant described the game testing task, reading from the predetermined set of instructions, 
provided in Appendix B. The assistant then answered any questions, made sure the game was 
loaded and working on each of the tablets, and left the room. The work was conducted 
unsupervised unless workers encountered problems.18 Workers were instructed to leave their 
tablets on the table when they departed. The last worker to leave each room was asked to send a 
text message to inform the manager that the room was empty so that the tablets could be secured. 
Workers were all told they would be paid within 2 days. 
After each day of sessions, total amounts owed to each worker were computed, and 
workers were paid as promised via PayPal. In total, the sessions generated data for an analysis 
sample of 236 workers. This includes 15 gender-balanced 4-person sessions in FP, TP15 and 
TP30 and 14 sessions in PR.19 
 
4. Effects of Tournament Pay on Labor Supply and Employer Costs 
This section discusses our main results from the control (FP) and main (TP30) treatments. The 
outcomes of interest include three measures of labor supply: duration of work, total 
                                                          
17 Worker that were assigned to rooms that were not full and balanced were all assigned to the FP 
treatment and their data are excluded from the analysis. 
18 We dropped all disrupted sessions, 6 in total. The disruptions occurred in early sessions because some 
workers started the program early and then tried to restart it later. After we become aware of this problem, 
we instructed the assistant to ensure that all programs were running properly and that all workers started 
at the same time, which eliminated further problems.  
19 There are only 14 piece rate rooms because one of the 15 sessions included a worker who had 
previously been hired under a different e-mail address (see footnote 9). We detected the issue only after 
the work sessions were complete and were therefore unable to add another session. 
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(unconditional) effort, and intensity of effort (conditional on working). The first two measures 
are novel to the literature on tournaments as they incorporate the extensive margin of labor 
supply. The third measure captures the intensive margin and is more standard in the existing 
literature. We also examine the effects of competition on employer costs in this section. Results 
from auxiliary treatments and estimation of heterogeneous effects by gender are discussed in 
later sections. 
 
 4.1 Effects on Time Worked  
Figure 1 presents histograms of the distributions of work time across individual RAs in the FP 
and TP30 treatments. It shows two notable features of the FP treatment, discussed in Section 2.1. 
First, the distribution of work time clearly demonstrates that some workers were induced to work 
longer than the minimum time with no direct financial incentives to do so. About 58% of the FP 
group worked longer than 11 minutes and the average time worked was 16.2 minutes. This 
indicates that our design efforts were successful at getting workers to treat the program testing 
RA job as they would another job and to therefore be willing to work longer in response to a 
(justifiable) request from their employer.20 Second, the fact that only small fraction of FP 
workers stayed the full 40 minutes confirms that effort was indeed costly to our workers. 
Comparing the FP and TP30 distributions in Figure 1 reveals our main result: offering a 
tournament prize induced people to work much longer. Workers assigned to TP30 worked 
substantially longer than those not offered a bonus. The median person in TP30 worked for the 
maximum time of 40 minutes and less than 15% worked for under 11 minutes. This shows that 
financial incentives based on relative performance increased work time well beyond the effects 
of behavioral considerations operating in FP.21  
                                                          
20 The presence of behavioral considerations hypothesized in Section 2.1 are confirmed in some workers’ 
statements of the reasons for staying the amount of time they did, such as feeling a moral obligation 
because they had been hired for a one-hour job (mentioned by 17.9% of workers who stayed for the full 
time). Other RAs (7.5% of those who stayed less than 40 minutes) apologized for leaving early or 
provided the excuse that they felt that staying longer would not be helpful to the professor. These 
statements also suggest that workers perceived that they were expected to stay to help the professor.    
21 It could be that the behavioral factors remained operational in TP30 (and that gift exchange was even 
enhanced by the opportunity for additional payment). It is also possible that financial incentives crowded 




We conducted non-parametric and regression-based tests to assess the statistical 
significance of the apparent difference between FP and TP30. Although we have data on 
individual workers, we take a conservative approach to testing and use a room-level unit of 
analysis. This is because strategic interactions (for TP30) and social norms (for FP and possibly 
for TP30) within rooms make it likely that outcomes are correlated across workers in the same 
room. Results are unchanged if we use the individual level instead.  
Our regression analysis, presented in column 1 of Table 1, supports the two main findings 
of Figure 1. The outcome is average time worked per person, and the unit of observation is a 
room. Because work time is bounded above (at 40) and below (at 10), we estimate Tobit models 
with upper and lower limits.22 The regressors of interest are the treatment groups. The omitted 
category is our main treatment, TP30, so point estimates in the table are all relative to that 
group.23 Workers without any monetary incentives for effort work significantly more than the 
minimum necessary for payment: the constant term + the FP treatment dummy = 16.25 minutes, 
which is significantly different from 10 (p < 0.001).24 Nevertheless, work time in FP is 
significantly (p < 0.01) and substantially (13.56 minutes per worker) lower than in TP30. Adding 
performance-pay in the form of a winner takes all tournament increased timed worked by about 
80%.25  
 
4.2 Effects on Effort 
The results in the previous section show that workers stayed longer in TP30, but not that they 
supplied greater effort or worked more intensively. We consider these outcomes next.  
                                                          
22 Results are unchanged if we use OLS models that ignore the bounds. Because the room level limits are 
only binding if all workers in the room are at the minimum or maximum time, we also confirmed that 
results are unchanged if we use an individual level analysis (with standard errors clustered at the room 
level) that applies the bounds at the individual worker level (the level at which they are imposed in the 
experiment). The coefficients in the individual-level Tobit models suggest a larger increase in work time 
between FP and TP30, making our main room-level estimates a conservative measure of the impact of 
competition on work time.  
23 To keep the models and results consistent throughout the paper, results for all treatments are in Tables 1 
and 2, though discussion of auxiliary treatments (PR and TP15) only starts in Section 5. 
24 A Wilcoxson signed rank test on room-level data from FP rejects the hypothesis that time stayed is 
equal to 11 (p = 0.01). 
25 The corresponding non-parametric comparison of these work time distributions shows the same results. 
The distribution of room level average time worked in TP30 first-order stochastically dominates the 
distribution in FP; the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yields p < 0.001. The opposite test (that FP dominates 
TP) is not significant, with p = 1 in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  
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The observable action that we use to signify effort is tapping the button to advance to the 
rest screen and our effort measure is the number of taps. If we instead use the number of total 
taps (also including taps on red and gold squares) as an effort measure, or if we only add taps on 
red squares (with no random component) to our effort measure, the results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively unchanged. Our main regression models have a room-level unit of observation (as 
in the previous section). We aggregate effort across workers and over the full session time and 
use two measures of effort. The first captures average effort per worker, where effort is the 
number of times a worker taps the “go to next screen” button in the session. The second isolates 
the intensive margin of effort supplied per worker by only including workers who are still 
formally “on the job” in the denominator. The measure is created by dividing the total effort 
supplied by workers in the room during the session by the total time worked in the session.  
To graphically explore how effort evolved over time, we also calculated room-level effort 
measures separately for each of the 40 minutes in the work session and then averaged these 
values across rooms by treatment category. Figure 2 displays the first measure, which is average 
effort per worker provided in each minute. In this measure, workers naturally contribute zero 
effort in minutes after they end their session. By contrast, those workers are excluded from the 
second effort measure, displayed in Figure 3, average effort per worker per minute among 
workers who are still working at that minute. We calculated that value for each minute using 
only individuals who worked for the full minute: we then divided their total effort during that 
minute by their number. The effort measures in Figure 2 and Figure 3 are the same for the first 
10 minutes when all four workers are working, but this changes after workers start to leave.  
Figures 2 and 3 clearly echo the two main patterns in the prior section: workers in the FP 
treatment continued to supply effort after the 10 minutes necessary for payment and effort was 
significantly higher in TP30.  
It is also apparent that allowing the extensive margin to vary in our field experiment was 
an important design feature, as that margin is by far the more economically significant one. 
Differences in the intensive effort measure are small, especially after the mandatory 10 minutes. 
Part of this might be because the sample of workers used to compute the intensive margin in 
Figure 3 is changing over time as workers who supply less extensive margin effort are dropped 
when they stop working. If these workers also supply less effort on the intensive margin, the 
sample of current workers becomes more favorably selected over time. Such selection effect 
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would be larger in FP than TP30 because more workers leave early in FP. We can eliminate this 
source of bias by focusing on the first 10 minutes of the session (in Figure 2 or 3): for those 
minutes, the graphs do suggest higher effort in TP30 than FP.  
A concern about focusing on the first 10 minutes is that effort might be changing during 
the session if workers get better at the task with practice or if they slow down when they get 
tired. Figure 3 shows no evidence of those dynamics: average effort (within treatment) was fairly 
constant after the first few minutes. A very similar picture appears if we remove selection effects 
by restricting attention to those who stayed for the full work time (giving us a balanced panel on 
a fixed set of workers). This lends supports to the value of examining effort in the first 10 
minutes and further suggests that our production technology is indeed linear. Learning (if it 
happens) is limited to the first 3 minutes and fatigue did not hamper performance within 40 
minutes of work.  
We quantify the magnitudes of these effects using room-level regressions, and report 
results in columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 1. Starting with the total effort measure, we find a 
substantial effect of competition on effort. Total room effort is 88% higher in TP30 than in FP 
(column 2).26 Conditional on working, the intensive margin of effort is also significantly greater 
in TP30 than in FP (p < 0.05 in column 3 for the entire session; p < 0.10 in column 4 for the first 
10 minutes),27 but the magnitude of the increase is fairly small. Relative to TP30, there is a mere 
4% reduction in mean effort intensity, either over the entire session (column 3) or within the first 
10 minutes (column 4).  
In unreported estimates, we also considered a different type of effort measure based on 
mistakes, defined as red or gold squares that are displayed but go “untapped.” These mistakes 
turned out to be very rare in our data. Out of 30,585 red squares shown on screens across all 
treatments, only 45 (0.15%) were not tapped. The fraction of red squares missed, the number of 
red squares, and an indicator for at least one red square missed in a room are all uncorrelated 
with the treatment. Workers were slightly more likely to miss tapping a gold square, but still the 
                                                          
26 Using non-parametric tests, we find that the total effort level in TP30 first-order stochastically 
dominates that in FP (with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests yielding p < 0.001), while total effort in FP does 
not dominate that in TP30.   
27 Using non-parametric tests for both intensive margin measures, we find that effort in TP30 first-order 
stochastically dominates the level in FP (with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests yielding p = 0.014 for the full 
session and p = 0.091 for the first 10 minutes) while effort in FP does not dominate that in TP30 (both 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests yield p = 1).   
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number is small. Out of 3,001 gold squares shown on screens in all treatments, 37 (1.2%) were 
not tapped. As with the red squares, the fraction of gold squares missed, the number missed, and 
an indicator for at least one being missed in a room are all uncorrelated with the treatment. 
Because these mistakes reflect effort invested on the intensive margin, the finding that they are 
uncorrelated with treatment supports the limited intensive margin response we found with our 
main effort measures. In light of these results, we focus on measures that include the extensive 
margin (time worked and total effort) in what follows.   
 
4.3 Effects on Employer Costs   
The previous two sections document large and significant increases in work time and effort in 
TP30 relative to FP, but the additional labor was not free. Rather, the increased effort was 
induced by paying a $30 prize to the worker with the most points in their room, which increased 
labor costs by 30%. This raises the question of whether paying for performance was worthwhile 
to the employer.  
Table 2 presents the answer to this question using several alternative measures of 
employer costs of effort or output. Column 1 examines labor costs per work minute, using the 
average amount paid per minute worked in the room. We find that TP30 significantly decreased 
labor costs per minute. Without the bonus, we paid $2.18 more for each minute worked, which 
corresponds to 46% higher costs per minute. In column 2, we use payment per red tap because 
the objective of the task was to earn points and red taps capture points earned irrespective of 
luck. We find the same result: TP30 was significantly cheaper than FP. We paid $0.11 more (or 
almost 50% more relative to the TP30 mean) per red tap in FP. In column 3, we return to our 
main effort measure from Section 4.2, the number of times workers tapped the “go to next 
screen” button, and measure costs per tap. Again, the results are the same: we paid $0.121 (52%) 
more for effort in FP. Results are also unchanged if we measure costs per point earned in the 
game (where each red square equals 1 point and each gold square equals 5 points; column 4), per 
tap of either a red or gold square (column 5), or for any action that could measure effort (i.e., 
tapping a red square, gold square or the “go to next screen” button; column 6). In each case, we 
paid significantly (at least 50%) more in FP than when we provided workers with performance-
based incentives. (Scaled to the higher average effort costs incurred in FP, the tournament prize 
reduced costs by over one-third.)   
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These measures show an economic value to employers of offering tournament incentives, 
which is the reduction in the cost of extracting effort from workers. Another benefit that applies 
in this setting may not generalize to other workplaces, but is worth noting: the improved quality 
of the “testing” data produced. Recall that one of our stated goals to workers was learning how 
long individuals could (physically and mentally) perform the red-square task. The answer to that 
question differs dramatically if we use results from FP or TP30. In FP, only 6.67% workers 
stayed the whole 40 minutes and 15% stayed 30 minutes or longer. In TP30, however, 55% 
stayed the full 40 minutes and 61.7% stayed 30 minutes or longer. Based on TP30, it appears that 
most workers could work for at least 40 minutes. If we had only run FP, we would have instead 
concluded that at most 10% of workers could do that. Although this particular outcome is 
specific to the RA tasked used in this study, it is worth noting that work quality (from the view of 
what the employer values) in our setting was also higher in TP30 than FP. 
 
5. Auxiliary Treatments 
In light of the large effects of TP30 on labor supply and employer costs, it is natural to ask if 
such a large prize was necessary to induce effort from workers. This is particularly relevant in 
our setting where work time was capped at 40 minutes and many TP30 workers worked that 
long. We assess this using the TP15 treatment that differs from our main TP30 treatment only in 
awarding a $15 rather than $30 prize to the winner.  
Because output and effort can be measured accurately in our task, it was also feasible to 
offer individual piece rate incentives that can be effective at motivating workers to supply more 
effort. We separately designed a PR treatment with a payment per point set to 3⅓ cents to match 
the amount that was paid in the TP30. As discussed in Section 2.3, this price is set to match the 
average employer costs across all workers, but it is not expected to match workers’ expected 
marginal returns to effort functions between the two treatments. Returns to effort are independent 
across workers in PR but depend on what others are expected to be doing in TP30. The results 
from these alternative treatments are shown in Figure 4 and Tables 1 and 2. 
Figure 4 depicts the CDF of room-level total time worked by treatment. Like Figures 1 
and 2, Figure 4 again depicts the longer work time in TP30 relative to FP that was discussed in 
Section 4.1. Interestingly, we find that work time is distributed nearly identically in TP30 and 
PR, with 48.2% of workers staying the full 40 minutes in PR. Work time appears somewhat 
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lower in TP15 compared to the other incentivized treatments, but still substantially longer than in 
FP, with 41.67% of workers staying the full 40 minutes.   
The regression results in Table 1 show the same patterns. The omitted category is TP30. 
Estimates in column 1 indicate that, while work time (in minutes per worker) was shorter in 
TP15 and slightly longer in the PR relative to TP30 (coefficients of -3.9 and 0.49, respectively), 
these differences are statistically insignificant. Table 1 also reports the relevant F-tests between 
each of the different treatment pairs. These tests indicate longer work times relative to FP in each 
of the three treatments that includes performance-based incentives but no significant differences 
among those treatments.28  
Column 2 reports estimates with the total effort measure that captures both extensive and 
intensive margins.29 As in column 1, we find no significant differences in total effort invested 
across the different treatments with financial incentives. The point estimates suggest lower effort 
in both TP15 and PR relative to TP30, but the differences are not statistically significant. The F-
tests, reported at the bottom of the table, further show that total effort in the auxiliary treatments 
was significantly higher than in FP and also that TP15 and PR are not significantly different from 
one another.  
The next two columns present results for the intensive margin effort measures: for the 
whole 40 minutes (in column 3) and for the first 10 minutes (when all workers are present and 
working, in column 4). For each of these measures, we find that neither auxiliary treatment is 
different from TP30, or from the other. The one difference that emerges in columns 3 and 4 is for 
tournaments relative to FP: workers invested significantly more intensive margin effort in TP15 
and TP30, but not in PR. Nevertheless, as the main impact of performance-based incentives 
occurs along the extensive margin of time worked, the pattern is still consistent with higher total 
effort in PR than in FP (as in column 2) and no significant difference in total effort between PR 
and the tournaments. 
                                                          
28 Again, the non-parametric tests deliver the same results. In both the TP15 and PR treatments, work time 
was significantly longer than in FP. The distribution of time worked in either of these treatments first-
order stochastically dominates FP (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests yield p = 0.005 and p < 0.001, 
respectively), but is not dominated by it (both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests yield p = 1). However, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the TP30, TP15, and PR are not 
different from one another. 
29 Interested readers can see the graphs for both intensive margin effort measures for all 4 treatments in 
Appendix Figures A1 and A2. 
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The fact that both TP15 and PR increased labor supply relative to FP (reported in Table 
1) suggests that the employer might have also been able to lower costs with the auxiliary 
treatments. This is shown in Table 2, which reports the various cost measures described in 
Section 4.3. Across the various measures of costs per output or effort, the auxiliary treatments 
are never significantly different from TP30 (i.e., the TP15 and PR coefficients are never 
significant). However, costs are significantly lower in the new bonus treatments TP15 and PR 
than they are in FP for every output and effort measure we consider (shown in the F-tests below 
the coefficients). The auxiliary treatments are also not different from one another (as indicated 
by the p-values for the last F test).  
The findings from the auxiliary treatments therefore provide further empirical support for 
the theoretical prediction that tournaments can lead to longer work time, while also showing that 
similar results can be achieved with individual incentives (when available to employers). The 
fact that TP15 and TP30 had similar effects on labor supply and employer costs shows that 
outcomes may not be overly sensitive to the precise details of the incentive scheme.30 The fact 
that tournaments can improve profits even if the employer is not able to solve for (or implement) 
the optimal prize structure provides additional support for their widespread use in practice. 
 
6. Gender Differences in Labor Supply Across Treatments 
In this section, we explore gender differences in labor supply within and across treatments. We 
focus on the extensive margin of effort, time worked, because that is the main driver of variation 
in total effort (Section 4.2), but also show that results are unchanged for total effort.31 Our unit of 
observation is now an individual, so we account for within-room correlations by clustering 
standard errors at the room level.  
We start by estimating separate effects of competition on the labor supply of male 
(columns 1 and 2) and female (columns 3 and 4) workers.  The results for time worked are 
depicted in Figure 5. Relative to TP30, we find that both male and female workers provide 
                                                          
30 Additional comparisons between TP30 and the alternative bonus schemes are presented in Online 
Appendix C. Section C.1 shows that effort is significantly higher in TP30 than in TP15 if we expand our 
model to control for “luck” (rate of gold stars per screen), suggesting that higher prizes induce more 
effort. Section C.2 shows a significantly lower rate of having a single worker in the room at 40 minutes in 
TP30 and PR, consistent with the spillovers across workers implied by the tournament structure.  
31 We find very few differences when examining our intensive margin measures of average effort per 
minute worked, overall or in the first 10 minutes. These results can be found in Appendix Table A2.   
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significantly less effort in FP. The p-values, reported at the bottom of the table, indicate that both 
male and female workers invested more effort in TP15 and in PR relative to FP. This indicates 
that men and women both respond to financial incentives based on either relative or individual 
performance metrics.  
However, Figure 5 also shows that responses differ by gender. Among the performance-
based incentive schemes, men provided the most effort in TP30, followed by PR, and then TP15. 
Women, on the other hand, provided the most effort in PR, followed by TP15 and TP30 (which 
appear nearly identical in the figure). We quantify these observations with regression estimates 
in the first four columns of Table 3. While the ordering is indeed as depicted in Figure 5, the 
only significant difference in effort provided across the incentivized treatments is for men 
between the two tournaments: men invest significantly less effort in the lower-stakes TP15 than 
in TP30. The other differences are statistically insignificant.   
Because Figure 5 groups outcomes by gender, differences between men and women are 
not readily apparent. We therefore show the distributions grouped by treatment in Figure 6. We 
also report estimated gender differences by treatment group in a regression framework by 
supplementing the separate regressions for male and female workers in columns 1-4 of Table 3 
with results from a pooled sample of men and women in columns 5 and 6. In these pooled 
models, the treatment dummies capture the differences across treatments (relative to TP30) for 
men.32  The coefficients for female interacted with each of the 4 treatment dummies correspond 
to the gender differences within each treatment.  
Figure 6 and the additional regression results indicate that men and women worked the 
same amount of time in FP and PR (coefficients on Female×FP and Female×PR are small and 
insignificant). Although the figure suggests gender differences in both tournament treatments, 
the regressions reveal the only significant difference is in TP30. Specifically, in TP30, women 
worked significantly less than men did (coefficient of -11.69, p = 0.044) and as a result invested 
less effort (coefficient of -35.47, p = 0.053). If the gender difference in work time and effort in 
TP30 applies to high-stakes competitions more generally, this result implies that women will be 
underrepresented among tournament winners, and hence less likely to be promoted to high 
ranking positions, even without external constraints on their work time. 
                                                          
32 The observant reader will note that the treatment dummies in Column 5 are not identical to the ones in 
Column 1. The reason is that we use a non-linear Tobit model for work time to account for censoring.  
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 The fact that we find a gender difference in effort in TP30 but not in TP15 is consistent 
with the prior literature on competition showing that gender differences vary depending on the 
specific features of the competition, such as the prize amount (Petrie and Segal, 2013) or nature 
of task (see Niederle, 2016 for a summary). However, because it presents a more complex 
picture, we further confirmed that the differential between the two tournaments was not the result 
of some spurious correlation from luck (being worse for women in TP30 or for men in TP15) or 
worker characteristics to treatments. Our balance checks in Appendix Table A1 indicate that 
background characteristics and luck are, on the whole, equal across treatments by gender. 
Nevertheless, we repeated the regressions in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 adding controls for 
characteristics and luck (the fraction of screens shown that included a gold square and the square 
of this value); the analysis confirms the same pattern of gender differences.  
To understand the source of the observed differences in effort between TP30 and TP15, 
we must first remember that each worker’s effort level is an equilibrium outcome in which that 
worker is responding optimally to their beliefs about the strategies of their 3 competitors. The 
marginal (financial) return to effort is the prize amount multiplied by the marginal increase in the 
probability of winning the prize from an increase in effort. Increasing the prize amount would 
always increase the returns to own effort if competitors kept their effort unchanged, but it seems 
likely that at least some competitors would also find the increased prize attractive and increase 
their effort. In particular, the value to any given worker of staying the entire time is lowered with 
each additional coworker who is expected to also stay that long. It would therefore be wrong to 
think that workers whose effort is unchanged are ignoring financial incentives because their 
expected financial incentives might not have changed much.33  
 The presence of a gender gap in TP30 and absence of one in TP15 together suggest that 
responses to tournament incentives are determined differently by gender. Because of the 
equilibrium effects described above, the pattern we observe can be generated by some utility 
factor that either (1) attracts men to TP30 more than to TP15 or (2) attracts women more to TP15 
                                                          
33 Consider a worker whose effort costs make them willing to stay 40 minutes for an expected bonus of 
$12 or higher. That worker will not compete in TP15 if they expect at least one other worker in their room 
at 40 minutes, because their expected bonus from staying that long is $7.5. The same worker would be 
willing to compete for 40 minutes in TP30 against one other person (expected bonus of $15) but not 
against 2 or 3 others (expected bonus of $10 or $7.5). If they faced one competitor in both TP15 and in 
TP30, that worker would supply more effort in TP30 than in TP15. However, if competition increased the 
number of competitors staying to the end from 1 in TP15 to 2 in TP30, the worker would supply the same 
low effort level in both. 
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than to TP30. Because we ran a field experiment, we cannot directly measure beliefs and 
preferences and with their help determine whether it is men or women who are responding 
differentially to TP30 versus TP15 or pinpoint the precise reasons for their behavior. To identify 
potential sources, we therefore turn to the strand of the experimental literature on gender and 
competition that, like this paper, assigns workers to different incentive schemes.34  
One possibility is gender ratios. Starting with Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), 
the literature documents that, under certain conditions, women respond significantly less to 
tournament incentives in mixed-gender competitions than men do. Although both TP15 and 
TP30 start out mixed-gender, financial considerations alone should cause fewer workers to stay 
to the end in TP15. Women in TP15 can therefore anticipate a higher chance of participating in 
an all-female contest in TP15 than in TP30. If the equilibrium number of workers staying 40 
minutes is 2 in TP15 and 3 in TP30, a woman who stays in TP15 has a one-third chance of 
facing only female competition, but one who stays in TP30 has no chance. Indeed, one-third of 
all TP15 sessions ended with female workers engaged in single-sex tournaments, while all TP30 
sessions had at least one male worker among the last to leave (Fisher exact test yields p = 0.042). 
Thus, our female workers may have found TP30 relatively less attractive because it involved 
competition with men and TP15 relatively more attractive because of competition with another 
woman (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Niederle, Segal and Vesterlund, 2013).  
It is also possible that male workers derived more utility from competing in TP30 than in 
TP15, and were willing to increase effort in it, because the higher prize amount made the 
competition more exciting and salient to them. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2017) document a large 
improvement (relative to piece rate) in male, but not female, performance in tournaments where 
competition is made salient, but not in other tournaments.   
Gender differences in beliefs and risk aversion can also produce differential responses to 
competitive pay. The literature on gender differences in tournament entry, going back to 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), finds these are important contributing factors.35 In our setting, if 
women believe that men perform better on the task, this could increase their willingness to 
                                                          
34 We focus on that strand because workers in our setting face a choice between working under a given 
incentive scheme or not working and leaving the workplace. They are not given a choice among different 
incentive schemes (as is done, for example, in Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, and Dohmen and Falk, 
2011). 
35 Recent work by Gillen et al. (forthcoming) even argues those factors explain the entire gender 
difference in entry. 
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compete against other women rather than against men. It is in fact a common finding that gender 
differences in competition arise primarily in tasks for which men are stereotypically expected to 
outperform women (for a summary, see Niederle, 2016). Additionally, differences in the number 
of active competitors can also affect the variance in payoffs between TP15 and TP30, which 
could produce gender differences in effort if men and women differ in their degree of risk 
aversion. For example, if women are more risk averse than men, they might be willing to stay 40 
minutes for a 50% chance of $15 but not for a 25% chance of $30, while men are willing to stay 
for both. Because mixed-sex competition, high salience, stereotypically male tasks, and high 
variance in payoffs are all part and parcel of high-stakes competition in the workplace, the 




Long work hours are pervasive in high-pay, high-status jobs. While this feature has previously 
been attributed to production technology and sorting into professions, we examine whether it 
could be explained by the competitive incentives common to those workplaces. That is, could on 
the job competition drive long work hours? The findings from our study suggest the answer is 
yes. 
 We use a field experiment at a real job to isolate the effects of competitive pay on 
employees’ work time and effort. Our comparison fixed payment scheme offered workers no 
financial incentives for additional effort beyond the mandatory work time, yet a majority of 
workers stayed longer after being asked to do so, suggesting some nonfinancial, behavioral 
motives are present. Work time and effort were significantly higher in our main treatment with a 
large tournament prize and lowered costs for the employer by more than a third. Auxiliary 
treatments with a piece rate bonus or a small tournament prize also induced higher worker effort 
and lower employer costs relative to fixed wages.  
When tournament incentives are cost-effective, it is natural that firms will offer them, and 
competitive jobs will entail long work hours. Therefore, our findings highlight a fundamental 
challenge for policy efforts aimed at reducing work hours in order to enhance overall worker 
wellbeing or improve gender equality in elite occupations. These policies may be rendered 
ineffective with pay incentives that encourage workers to voluntarily supply additional labor and 
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circumvent formal hours restrictions.36 Moreover, policies effective at reducing hours may entail 
substantial costs to employers and some employees. 
Our field experiment also revealed a significant gender difference in labor supply, but 
only in the high-prize tournament. The fact that men worked longer in that tournament hints at a 
second channel through which high-stakes workplace competition can contribute to gender gaps 
in labor markets. The first is based on our overall result that indicates that competition can 
increase the work hours needed to succeed in elite professional careers. This disproportionately 
deters women, who traditionally have more binding time constraints from greater household 
obligations. The second channel is through differential effects of high-stakes competition on 
labor supply, even absent any differences in time constraints.     
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Figure 1: Histogram of Time Worked 
 
Notes: Distribution of work time across individual workers in TP30 ($30 tournament prize) and FP (fixed payment) 

























Figure 2: Mean Room Effort per Minute  
 
Notes: Average room-level effort per minute of work session in TP30 ($30 tournament prize) and FP (fixed 
payment) treatments.  
 
Figure 3: Mean Room Effort Conditional on Working per Minute 
 
Notes: Average room-level effort per minute of work session, among workers still on the job for that minute, in 






Figure 4: CDF of Average Time Worked in Room by Treatment 
Notes: CDF of room-level average work time per session in TP30 ($30 tournament prize), FP (fixed payment), TP15 




Figure 5: Treatment Differences by Gender 
Male   Female 
  
Notes: CDF of individual work time per session in TP30 ($30 tournament prize), FP (fixed payment), TP15 ($15 











Notes: CDF of individual work time per session by gender, separately for TP30 ($30 tournament prize), FP (fixed 











Table 1: Effects of Compensation Scheme on Room Level Labor Supply  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Time Worked 
 






Minute in the First 10 
Minutes 
Main Treatments 
FP -13.562*** -70.867*** -0.214** -0.210* 
 [2.494] [12.687] [0.086] [0.121] 
Auxiliary Treatments  
TP15 -3.921 -19.017 -0.025 0.033 
 [3.011] [15.412] [0.087] [0.110] 
PR 0.494 -1.587 -0.112 -0.109 
 [2.859] [13.511] [0.075] [0.126] 
Constant 29.807*** 151.033*** 5.123*** 5.020*** 
 [2.023] [9.881] [0.058] [0.090] 
     
Prob>F: TP15 = FP < 0.001 < 0.001 0.0415 0.0218 
Prob>F: PR = FP < 0.001 < 0.001 0.201 0.405 
Prob>F: TP15 = PR 0.15 0.25 0.281 0.196 
     
Observations 59 59 59 59 
R2  0.384 0.130 0.196 
Notes: Observations at the room level. Tobit model is estimated for time worked and linear regressions for effort 
measures. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
Table 2: Effects of Compensation Scheme on Labor Costs 
















Red or Gold 
Square 
Pay for Any 
Tap (Red, gold, 
or “Go to Rest 
Screen”) 
Main Treatments 
FP 2.181*** 0.114*** 0.121*** 0.081*** 0.105*** 0.056*** 
 [0.678] [0.035] [0.037] [0.026] [0.033] [0.017] 
Auxiliary Treatments  
TP15 0.364 0.018 0.020 0.011 0.016 0.009 
 [0.626] [0.033] [0.034] [0.023] [0.030] [0.016] 
PR -0.179 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 
 [0.401] [0.022] [0.023] [0.016] [0.020] [0.011] 
Constant 4.709*** 0.229*** 0.232*** 0.156*** 0.210*** 0.110*** 
 [0.344] [0.019] [0.020] [0.014] [0.018] [0.009] 
       
Prob>F: TP15 = FP 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.019 
Prob>F: PR = FP < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.0011 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Prob>F: TP15 = PR 0.338 0.398 0.397 0.353 0.384 0.390 
       
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 
R2 0.244 0.245 0.250 0.248 0.246 0.248 
Notes: Observations at the room level. Pay is total pay, counting fixed payments plus any bonuses. Robust standard 




Table 3: Labor Supply Results by Gender 













FP -25.577*** -89.833*** -14.000*** -51.900*** -25.769*** -89.833*** 
 [4.693] [14.795] [5.007] [17.262] [4.695] [14.827] 
TP15 -14.120** -43.533** 1.434 5.500 -14.238** -43.533** 
 [6.099] [20.085] [6.028] [20.192] [6.217] [20.128] 
PR -6.985 -19.302 5.366 16.129 -7.068 -19.302 
 [5.656] [16.057] [6.134] [19.109] [5.712] [16.091] 
Female x TP30     -11.694** -35.467* 
     [5.775] [17.940] 
Female x FP     0.164 2.467 
     [2.018] [9.328] 
Female x TP15     3.967 13.567 
     [5.484] [19.461] 
Female x PR     0.714 -0.036 
     [4.829] [14.688] 
Constant 42.259*** 168.767*** 30.872*** 133.300*** 42.464*** 168.767*** 
 [4.452] [11.195] [4.743] [14.999] [4.367] [11.219] 
       
Prob>F: TP15 = FP 0.032 0.020 0.001 <0.001   
Prob>F: PR = FP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   
Prob>F: TP15 = PR 0.237 0.237 0.500 0.557   
       
Observations 118 118 118 118 236 236 
R2  0.242  0.153  0.199 
Notes: Observations at the worker level. Tobit models are estimated for time worked and linear regressions for total 
effort (over the session). Robust standard errors clustered at the room level in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * 
p < 0.1 
 
